



Scoping Out the Limits of “Arms” Under the 
Second Amendment 
I. INTRODUCTION 
With the adoption of the Bill of Rights in 1791, the following words 
were officially incorporated into the U.S. Constitution: “A well regulated 
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the 
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”1  The proposal 
was neither more radical nor more controversial than any other provision 
in the Bill of Rights at the time; after all, the use of militia in the 
American colonies dated as far back as 1643.2  Their role in the 
Revolutionary War, while perhaps secondary to that of the Continental 
Army proper, was nevertheless well-documented.3  Additionally, much 
of the law of England supported the privilege of citizens to “have 
[a]rms”4—though this was not elevated to the level of a “right” in all 
instances of the phrase.5  As Justice Scalia observed in 2008’s District of 
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 1. U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 2. ROBERT K. WRIGHT JR., MASSACHUSETTS MILITIA ROOTS: A BIBLIOGRAPHIC STUDY 4 
(1986), available at http://www.history.army.mil/Reference/mamil/Mamil.htm.  As Captain Wright 
explained, “The colony’s first comprehensive militia law was passed on 7 September 1643.”  Id. 
(citation omitted). 
 3. See, e.g., Andrew Ronemus, Minutemen, USHISTORY.ORG, http://www.ushistory.org/people/ 
minutemen.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2011). 
 4. See, e.g., An Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject and Settling the 
Succession of the Crown, 1689, 1 W. & M., Sess. 2, c. 2 (Eng.), (“That the subjects which are 
Protestants may have Arms for their Defence suitable to their Conditions and as allowed by law.”). 
 5. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 583 n.7 (2008) (gathering sources that 
illustrate the nature of the right to “keep arms” at English common law); Burton v. Sills, 248 A.2d 
521, 526 (N.J. 1968) (“The common law did not recognize any absolute right to keep and bear 
arms . . . .”); 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *56 (noting that Catholics who failed to 
attend the services of the Church of England were not permitted to “keep arms in their houses”); 
Lucilius A. Emery, The Constitutional Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 28 HARV. L. REV. 473, 473 
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Columbia v. Heller, however, “[I]t has always been widely understood 
that the Second Amendment, like the First and Fourth Amendments, 
codified a pre-existing right.”6 
During the debate over the Bill of Rights, the most controversial 
element of Madison’s original proposition for what would become the 
Second Amendment7 centered around the issue of the “religiously 
scrupulous” clause, rather than whether citizens should have the right to 
bear arms or what, exactly, constituted “arms” in the first place.8  In the 
more than 220 years since, the majority of debate concerning the Second 
Amendment has largely concerned the question of whether this “right” 
applies only in the context of a communal militia or whether American 
citizens have an individual right to bear arms that is independent of an 
organized militia.9 
Consequently, scholars and the courts have largely left “arms” 
undefined, with only a few hints scattered throughout more than two 
centuries of Second Amendment jurisprudence.10  This was hardly 
problematic in the days of the adoption of the Bill of Rights, when an 
expert marksman bearing a muzzle-loading flintlock musket or rifle 
might be able to fire his weapon three times per minute,11 but weapons 
technology has advanced exponentially in the 220 years since.  In the 
face of napalm, fully automatic assault rifles, mines, poison gas, and 
even nuclear weapons, a broadly permissive definition of “arms” 
protected under the Second Amendment would not merely be absurd—it 
would be the epitome of madness. 
                                                                                                                       
(1915) (“The guaranty [of a right to bear arms] does not appear to have been of a common-law 
right . . . .  On the contrary, it was as early as 1328 declared . . . that no man should ‘go nor ride 
armed . . . in no part elsewhere upon pain,’ etc.” (quoting Statute of Northampton, 1328, 2 Edw. 3, 
ch. 3 (Eng.))). 
 6. 554 U.S. at 592. 
 7. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 424, 434 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).  As James Madison 
proposed, “The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; a well armed and 
well regulated militia being the best security of a free country; but no person religiously scrupulous 
of bearing arms shall be compelled to render military service in person.”  Id. 
 8. See PATRICK J. CHARLES, THE SECOND AMENDMENT: THE INTENT AND ITS 
INTERPRETATION BY THE STATES AND THE SUPREME COURT 34–36 (2009) (describing the 
congressional debates on the “religiously scrupulous” language in drafts of the Second Amendment). 
 9. See, e.g., Heller, 554 U.S. at 577.  As Justice Scalia noted, “It should be unsurprising that 
such a significant matter [as the extent of Second Amendment protection over arms] has been for so 
long judicially unresolved.”  Id. at 625. 
 10. For a further discussion of the chain of cases discussing the Second Amendment, see infra 
Part II.B. 
 11. See, e.g., David. S. Lux, Brown Bess, in GUNS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY: A–L 84, 86 (Gregg 
Lee Carter ed., 2002) (“An effectively trained soldier equipped with [a] smooth-bore musket[] could 
fire at least three rounds per minute on command.”). 
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Obviously, the majority of these weapons are unavailable to 
American civilians, despite the weapons’ usefulness to the military.12  
This, along with certain comments interspersed among the various 
Supreme Court cases on the subject, indicates that there are at least some 
restrictions on the arms protected by the Second Amendment.  Yet the 
question remains: Just what arms, exactly, does the Second Amendment 
cover?  Put another way: What is the full extent of the “right” to bear 
arms?  Is a tank protected as arms?  Is napalm?  Biological or chemical 
weapons?  Automatic weapons?  What about Tasers?  Or, at the futuristic 
end of the spectrum, are powerful hand-held laser projectors—at least 
some of which are reportedly capable of causing permanent blindness 
upon the slightest contact with an eye13—protected under the Second 
Amendment?  The Court in Heller attempted to offer some insight into 
the question, stating that the weapons protected are those “in common 
use at the time,”14 but excluding “dangerous and unusual weapons.”15  
Yet, for reasons that Part III elaborates further, this standard provides 
insufficient guidance on the matter, and the Court should clarify or revise 
it to resolve the lingering uncertainties inherent in the standard. 
Before proposing an alternate standard, this Comment will examine 
the historical understanding of arms within both the context of the 
Second Amendment and under international law at large.  In Part II, this 
Comment will briefly analyze the holding of Heller, the most recent 
Supreme Court case to discuss the question; it will then provide an 
overview of the historical development of weapons technology in the 
years since the adoption of the Second Amendment.  It will also 
summarize the key Supreme Court cases that provide the basis for the 
current state of the federal law on arms and examine the statutory law 
that purports to limit the arms that citizens may own and use.  Part III 
will consider the current controlling tests on the matter—namely the 
“common use” standard announced in Heller and made directly 
                                                          
 12. For a brief overview of federal statutory law, see infra Part II.C.  This Comment does not 
provide a survey of relevant state law.  For a comprehensive compilation of such law, see U.S. 
BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS & EXPLOSIVES, PUB. 5300.5, STATE LAWS AND 
PUBLISHED ORDINANCES—FIREARMS (30th ed. 2010), available at http://www.atf.gov/publications/ 
download/p/atf-p-5300-5-2011/2009-30th-edition.pdf. 
 13. See, e.g., Caution: Blue Light Hazard, WICKED LASERS, http://www.wickedlasers.com/ 
laser-tech/blue_light_hazard.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2011) (“Accidental eye exposure will 
definitely result in instant retina tissue damage even within just milliseconds of exposure.  Direct eye 
contact with the beam or reflected [beam] will cause instant permanent damage and blindness.”). 
 14. Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 (quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 15. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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applicable to the states via McDonald v. City of Chicago16—and argue 
that only a more definite rule will resolve the considerable uncertainty 
raised by the current “common use” standard.  Finally, Part III.D will 
suggest a two-part test to determine whether a weapon qualifies as 
“arms” under the Second Amendment: (1) the weapon must pose no 
significantly greater threat to human life than a handgun and (2) the 
innate characteristics of the weapon must generally favor legitimate 
purposes, such as self-defense or hunting, over criminal ones. 
II. BACKGROUND 
To provide a background for analysis of the current standards 
applied by the Supreme Court on the question of arms, it is necessary to 
first provide a brief overview of the history, case law, and statutory law 
that contribute to an understanding of the Second Amendment. 
A. Principal Advances in Arms Technology Since 1791 
To answer the question at the center of this Comment—what are 
“arms” under the Second Amendment?—the first place to look for 
guidance is history.  At the time of the Bill of Rights, “arms” meant 
“weapons of offence, or armour of defence.”17  While this basic meaning 
has not substantially changed between that time and the present day,18 
the technology constituting “arms” in the twenty-first century is radically 
different than anything the Framers could have imagined.  Given this 
vast dissonance, it is crucial to understand exactly what the Framers 
understood about “arms” when they enshrined the right to bear them.  
Perhaps even more importantly, this background underscores the 
tremendous advances that have propelled weapons technology into the 
modern era. 
1. Weapons Technology in the Eighteenth Century 
During the American Revolutionary War and the years beyond, the 
most advanced arm of the day was the muzzle-loading flintlock 
                                                          
 16. 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) (plurality opinion).  
 17. See 1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 1770). 
 18. 1 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 634 (2d. ed. 1989) (defining “arms” as a “defensive and 
offensive outfit for war, things used in fighting”). 
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smoothbore musket.19  In the hands of even a trained soldier, the weapon 
could produce barely more than three shots per minute, with a high rate 
of misfire and substantially less accuracy than later weapons.20  The 
British “Brown Bess” Long Land Pattern Musket exemplified this type 
of firearm and, in one incarnation or another, saw active service in the 
British military from 1722 until well into the mid-nineteenth century.21 
One loaded these weapons, like most from this era, by ramming a 
bullet down the entirety of the gun’s barrel.22  The firing mechanism of 
the Brown Bess and other guns like it was known as the flintlock, and it 
represented one of the most advanced technological innovations of the 
day.23  When one pulled the gun’s trigger, a spring-loaded metal arm—
bearing a piece of flint within it—released and swung the flint forward.24  
This flint then struck an iron bar, known as a frizzen, to create sparks.25  
These sparks fell into a pan of waiting gunpowder, poured beforehand, 
which then ignited the charge and propelled the bullet out through the 
barrel of the gun.26 
The chemical propellant used during this time—referred to as 
gunpowder or black powder27—was itself a significant limitation on arms 
                                                          
 19. Technological limitations—like the reliance on black powder for propulsion, which 
produced soot and smoke fouled a gun’s mechanics and vastly limited visibility—detracted from 
widespread use of early rifles.  JOHN WALTER, THE RIFLE STORY: AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY FROM 
1756 TO THE PRESENT DAY 14–15 (2006); see also infra notes 27–31 and accompanying text 
(discussing limitations imposed by reliance on black powder).  “[F]ew armies regarded the 
additional expense worth the limited gains: rifled weapons, unless they were breech-loaders, were 
much slower to load than smooth-bore muskets.”  WALTER, supra, at 19.  By the late eighteenth 
century, propellant and other technology eventually caught up with rifling technology to allow for 
quicker, more efficient firing.  TOWNSEND WHELEN, THE AMERICAN RIFLE: A TREATISE, A TEXT 
BOOK, AND A BOOK OF PRACTICAL INSTRUCTION IN THE USE OF THE RIFLE 3–5 (1918).  Still, these 
guns lacked the substantial power associated with later guns.  Id. at 5. 
 20. Lux, supra note 11, at 86. 
 21. See id. at 84–86.  The gun itself was so renowned by posterity that English author Rudyard 
Kipling composed a poem dedicated to it in 1911—over half a century after the gun’s retirement 
from active service.  Rudyard Kipling, Brown Bess, in A HISTORY OF ENGLAND 177–79 (1911).  
Particularly notable is the last stanza of the poem: “And if ever we English have reason to bless/Any 
arm save our mothers’, that arm is Brown Bess!”  Id. at 179. 
 22. See WHELEN, supra note 19, at 7–9; see also Marshall Brian, How Flintlock Guns Work, 
HOWSTUFFWORKS, http://science.howstuffworks.com/flintlock2.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2011).  
These were known as “muzzle-loading” weapons, as opposed to the “breech-loading” weapons that 
one loaded from the rear.   
 23. See Brian, supra note 22. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. See HARCOURT OMMUNDSEN & ERNEST HERBERT ROBINSON, RIFLES AND AMMUNITION 
AND RIFLE SHOOTING 111–12 (1915). 
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technology.  This powder converted much of its potential chemical 
energy into thick black smoke and a large quantity of soot;28 this 
precluded accuracy at ranges of more than a few dozen yards.29  Worse—
and more importantly, in terms of a technological limitation—the soot 
itself fouled the components of a gun and necessitated frequent 
cleaning.30  This rendered the possibility of complex internal mechanics 
unfeasible and rifling impractical.31 
Thus, while state of the art for its day, flintlock muzzle-loading 
muskets faced several serious limitations.  These weapons were 
relatively inaccurate at all but close range32 and featured a relatively slow 
reload time.33  Further, they were prone to misfires34 and, because of the 
open pan of gunpowder, were notorious for weather-related 
unreliability.35  Additionally, the copious amounts of smoke and soot 
further reduced the functionality of the weapons in terms of accuracy and 
firing rate.36  An assailant wielding only a single musket could not 
embark upon the kind of killing spree that has become so infamous in the 
modern era.  In the ten- to fifteen-second span it would take to reload a 
musket, any potential victims could rapidly overwhelm a single 
shooter.37  Indeed, battle tactics of the Revolutionary War—the heyday 
                                                          
 28. See id. at 113 (“[I]t may be said that the simplest knowledge of chemistry enables one to 
realize that smoke is only non-consumed matter in a very fine state of division.  Black powder 
produced a large quantity of this soot . . . .”). 
 29. See Lux, supra note 11, at 86 (noting that maximum ranges for accurate firing did not 
exceed forty or fifty yards, but explaining that military strategy accommodated this). 
 30. E.g., Clarence F. Allen, Smokeless Powders, 32 POPULAR MECHANICS MAG. 221, 221 
(1919) (“Thus, if the ammunition is of the old black-powder variety, a few shots will foul the bore so 
badly that to secure further accuracy, [a shooter] will have to stop and clean it and repeat the 
cleaning every few shots . . . .”). 
 31. See supra note 19. 
 32. See, e.g., Lux, supra note 11, at 84 (“With a musket, even a good marksman could not 
expect to hit a man-sized target at any more than 40 to 50 yards.  Individual aiming, however, was 
not called for . . . . [I]nfrantrymen were trained to point and shoot [without] aim[ing] at any 
individual target.”). 
 33. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 34. See WALTER, supra note 19, at 18. 
 35. See JOSEPH T. GLATTHAAR & JAMES KIRBY MARTIN, FORGOTTEN ALLIES: THE ONEIDA 
INDIANS AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 27 (2006) (“Once dampened, gunpowder lost its 
combustibility, and strong winds could blow priming powder from the pan.”). 
 36. See, e.g., Lux, supra note 11, at 86. 
 37. The tragic January 8, 2011, shooting in Tucson underscores the point, unfortunately.  In that 
incident, a single assailant armed with a handgun and a thirty-three-round magazine killed six people 
and wounded fourteen more in one or two minutes.  Paul M. Barrett, Glock: America’s Gun, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Jan. 17–23, 2011, at 51, 52.  In the wake of this shooting, even Robert 
A. Levy—chairman of the board of the Cato Institute and both co-counsel and a driving force in 
Heller—has stated that a ban on high-capacity magazines has a “very good chance” of surviving a 
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of the Brown Bess and other smoothbore flintlock—largely revolved 
around massed formations of soldiers who fired simultaneously rather 
than on soldiers firing individually.38  These were the limitations on 
“arms” during the time of the Second Amendment’s adoption—not 
limitations in the legal sense, but rather in the technological. 
2. The Tools of World War: Advances in Nineteenth Century Arms 
Technology 
The nineteenth century saw numerous, highly lethal, and previously 
unthinkable advances in the technology of weapons over a relatively 
short span of time.  So rapid were these new innovations that the tactics 
of war during this time period failed entirely to keep pace with the 
changing weapons.39  A century of technological advancement resulted 
in a markedly different breed of weapons than anything the Framers of 
the Constitution could have imagined, along with a totally alien manner 
of warfare. 
Of the advances in firearms technology pioneered during this 
century, several are worthy of brief note.  Powder pans and flintlocks 
gave way to percussion caps.40  These yielded, along with the old musket 
ball, to self-contained cartridges in metal casings, making for more 
mechanized firing systems.41  Revolvers using cartridge-based 
ammunition replaced single-shot musket pistols and allowed a single 
shooter to rapidly fire several lethal shots in a matter of seconds.42  
Single-shot muzzle-loading smoothbore muskets gave way to breech-
loading rifles,43 then repeating rifles.44  Finally, true automatic machine 
                                                                                                                       
constitutional challenge.  Seth McLaughlin, Arizona Shootings Prompt Call for Ban on High 
Capacity Clips, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2011, at A1. 
 38. See Lux, supra note 11, at 84. 
 39. See, e.g., PADDY GRIFFITH, BATTLE TACTICS OF THE CIVIL WAR 17 (1989) (noting that 
“[t]actics lagged behind technology in the 1860s” and “Civil War assault formations were obsolete 
in comparison to the fire against which they were launched”). 
 40. See OMMUNDSEN & ROBINSON, supra note 27, at 21 (“The most noteworthy improvement, 
apart from those affecting the bullet or the charge, was the invention, in 1807, of the percussion 
system of ignition.”). 
 41. See id. at 34 (describing four periods of projectile history, ending with “the modern period, 
[which] dates from the adoption of solid cartridge-case used with the breech-loader”). 
 42. Tom Harris, How Revolvers Work, HOWSTUFFWORKS, http://science.howstuffworks.com/ 
revolver.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2011). 
 43. See OMMUNDSEN & ROBINSON, supra note 27, at 20 (“Subsequent improvements up to the 
date of the adoption of breech-loading were directed towards reducing the fouling, and so adjusting 
weight of bullet, twist of rifling and power of explosion as to give the longest and most accurate 
range to the bullet.”). 
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guns—like the Maxim gun of the 1880s—became available.45  This 
weapon—the world’s first true, self-powered automatic weapon46—could 
fire over 600 rounds per minute.47  To the Framers just a century before, 
this hail of fire would have been unthinkable.  It would have taken 200 
Revolutionary War musket-equipped minutemen each firing a full three 
shots per minute to match that volume.48 
In the world of ammunition, spherical musket balls gave way to the 
conical Minié ball, a longer, larger round designed for rifles that 
provided more accuracy than older ammunition because of the way it 
expanded to fit the rifle’s grooves.49  Eventually, cartridges containing a 
sharply pointed lead round and a quantity of gunpowder, all covered in a 
harder metal jacket, became the norm.50  Additionally, technology 
allowed for more devastating rounds like the exploding bullet51 and the 
expanding bullet.52  International treaty eventually banned military use of 
both exploding bullets53 and expanding bullets.54  Black powder was 
abandoned in favor of the more efficient smokeless powder, which 
produced more force and much less smoke.55  This increased battlefield 
visibility and created less soot to foul a gun’s mechanical components.56  
Significantly, smokeless powder generated more energy to propel a 
                                                                                                                       
 44. See id. at 92–94. 
 45. The Maxim Automatic Machine Gun, 2 ILLUSTRATED NAVAL & MIL. MAG. 350, 350 
(1885). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 352. 
 48. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 49. See OMMUNDSEN & ROBINSON, supra note 27, at 47–48. 
 50. See, e.g., id. at 102–04 (discussing the development of the first modern metal cartridge by 
the Swiss Major Eduard Rubin). 
 51. An exploding bullet contains an explosive charge in its tip, designed to explode upon 
impact.  See B. Swift & G.N. Rutty, The Exploding Bullet, 57 J. CLINICAL PATHOLOGY 108, 108 
(2004) (discussing the behavior of such bullets upon impact). 
 52. Examples of expanding bullets include both hollow-point and soft-point bullets that, upon 
impact, expanded far beyond their normal size in order to tear a much larger hole than a normal shot.  
See OMMUNDSEN & Robinson, supra note 27, at 118–20. 
 53. See Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 
Grammes Weight, Dec. 11, 1868, 18 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 1) 474, 138 Consol. T.S. 297. 
 54. Hague Declaration (IV, 3) Concerning the Prohibition of the Use of Expanding Bullets, July 
29, 1899, 26 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 2) 1002, 187 Consol. T.S. 459 [hereinafter Hague 
Expanding Bullets Declaration].  The United States is not a party to the Hague Convention, see id., 
and recreational use of expanding bullets continues in some instances.  See OMMUNDSEN & 
ROBINSON, supra note 27, at 179–80.  For further discussion of expanding bullets, see infra Part 
III.B.4. 
 55. See, e.g., OMMUNDSEN & ROBINSON, supra note 27, at 111–13. 
 56. See id. 
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bullet, which produced higher muzzle velocity—and, consequently, 
greater lethality—for every shot.57 
To summarize, the trend of small-arms technological advancements 
during the nineteenth century arced toward greater accuracy, expanded 
range, deadlier munitions, and higher rates of fire—including the advent 
of true automatic weapons—than had previously been thought possible.  
These innovations would not only shape the next half-century of warfare, 
they would persist, with relatively few changes, to the modern day. 
3. Weapons of the Twentieth Century and Beyond 
For the purposes of this discussion, it is not necessary to catalog the 
development of horrifyingly effective poison gases, biological weapons, 
and nuclear ordnance.  To say that they were created during the twentieth 
century, that most were unleashed upon human beings at one time or 
another, and that many still exist today—albeit closely controlled by the 
governments of the world—is sufficient.  One may also surmise that the 
men who drafted the Second Amendment could never have conceived 
the horrors of nuclear holocaust when they enshrined “the right of the 
people to keep and bear Arms” in the Bill of Rights.58  
One might suppose that, given the Second Amendment’s discussion 
of militia, these most extreme and deadly of weapons cannot possibly 
constitute protected “arms” under the Second Amendment.  The Supreme 
Court, however, has stated that “arms” need not necessarily fit within a 
militia purpose.59  A cursory reading of Heller suggests that weapons that 
are “in common use at the time” receive protection from the Second 
Amendment.60  One might hypothesize in reductio ad absurdum that, 
should mutant anthrax or hydrogen bombs ever fall into “common use” 
by the citizenry, then they too would qualify as lawful “arms.”61 
Leaving behind, for the moment, the “common use” predicament, 
there remains a problem with a number of advanced weapons—or, at the 
                                                          
 57. See id. 
 58. U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 59. See infra Part III.A.4. 
 60. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627 (2008) (quoting United States v. Miller, 
307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 61. Obviously, “in common use” is not the only test controlling the protected status of a 
particular arm, see infra Part III, but it remains a central component of current Second Amendment 
jurisprudence.  The point raised here, however, is that reliance solely on the “in common use” 
standard fails to produce a coherent approach to understanding and applying the Second 
Amendment. 
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very least, quasi-weapons—that have arisen in recent years.  For the 
purposes of this Comment, discussion of two troublesome examples of 
these new “weapons”62—the ray-emitting Active Denial System (ADS) 
and other similar instruments,63 and high-powered, hand-held Class IV 
lasers like the S3 Spyder III Arctic64—will suffice.  Class IV lasers, 
though they have the capacity to burn skin or permanently blind a target 
with even an indirect pathway to an eye,65 are not marketed or 
necessarily even intended to be used as “weapons” per se.66  
Consequently, they challenge all traditional notions of “arms” and resist 
easy categorization precisely because they are so unlike the kinds of 
weapons that have come before. 
Part III examines the status of both ADS and ADS-type weapons and 
Class IV lasers.  For the moment, however, it is sufficient to note that 
both weapons represent only the tip of the iceberg in terms of future 
weapons development.  Technology is unlikely to cease advancing over 
the next century, and the analysis applied to these “weapons” is but a 
preview of the discourse that will emerge in the coming years.  In light of 
this, however, the necessity for a coherent and precise standard in 
determining what items are and are not protected “arms” becomes even 
more important. 
B. Principal Second Amendment Case Law 
In the wake of McDonald v. City of Chicago, the Second 
Amendment right to keep and bear arms applies against the states.67  To 
the extent that they conflict with federal legislation,68 all state 
                                                          
 62. Another troubling weapon category is that of the Taser or “stun gun.”  These devices use 
electricity to incapacitate an assailant without killing him.  See Eugene Volokh, Nonlethal Self-
Defense, (Almost Entirely) Nonlethal Weapons, and the Rights to Keep and Bear Arms and Defend 
Life, 62 STAN. L. REV. 199, 204–05 (2009).  The status of Tasers as “arms,” however, is considered 
in greater detail elsewhere.  See, e.g., id. at 218–21.  As such, a discussion of the status of Tasers 
here is not merited, save to note that their classification as protectable “arms” remains uncertain in 
the wake of McDonald v. City of Chicago. 
 63. See infra Part III.C.1. 
 64. See S3 Arctic Series: World’s Most Powerful Handheld Laser, WICKED LASERS, 
http://www.wickedlasers.com/lasers/Spyder_III_Pro_Arctic_Series-96-37.html (last visited Oct. 12, 
2011); see also infra Part III.C.2. 
 65. See infra text accompanying notes 219–20. 
 66. See S3 Arctic Series, supra note 64 (cautioning users never to point the laser at another 
person, animal, or vehicle). 
 67. 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010). 
 68. The Second Amendment contains no clause to execute itself and is thus dependent on 
congressional legislation via the Fourteenth Amendment.  See U.S. CONST. amend II.  The laws 
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constitutional provisions and statutes on the matter—and, by proxy, the 
multifarious state court rulings on the right itself69—have thus been 
rendered effectively subordinate to the U.S. Constitution.70  Now that 
state courts are bound by such constraints when a conflict exists between 
state and federal arms laws, this Comment will address only the principal 
federal decisions that make up the background of current Second 
Amendment case law on “arms” determinations. 
1. United States v. Miller 
The first Supreme Court case to actually address the Second 
Amendment would not come until 1939, when the Court decided United 
States v. Miller.71  The defendants in Miller were charged, under the 
1934 National Firearms Act,72 with unlawfully transporting a short-
barreled shotgun in interstate commerce.73  Challenging the statute on 
constitutional grounds, the defendants claimed that the Act “offend[ed] 
the inhibition of the Second Amendment.”74  The district court agreed 
and quashed the indictment against the defendants.75  The Government 
appealed directly to the Supreme Court.76 
Considering the question, Justice McReynolds, writing for the 
majority, placed strong emphasis on the lack of usefulness of short-
                                                                                                                       
passed by Congress concerning the enforcement of the Second Amendment, however, hold 
supremacy over state laws to the same effect, but only to the extent that they conflict.  U.S. CONST. 
art. VI, cl. 2; see also Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76 (2008) (“[W]e have long recognized 
that state laws that conflict with federal law are ‘without effect.’”) (quoting Maryland v. Louisiana, 
451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981)).  This leaves the states in an unusual predicament.  On the one hand, state 
laws cannot be more restrictive than existing federal laws, but at the same time, states cannot pass 
more permissive laws than federal regulations currently allow.  Because the federal laws ultimately 
set the current boundaries, this Comment will focus on federal laws. 
 69. See, e.g., Britt v. State, 681 S.E.2d 320, 322–23 (N.C. 2009) (applying a state constitutional 
provision worded identically to the Second Amendment in a pre-McDonald environment). 
 70. Although this Comment does not address the potential fate of state laws and constitutional 
provisions in light of the Second Amendment’s incorporation against the states, other sources 
provide such commentary.  See, e.g., Nicholas J. Johnson, Administering the Second Amendment: 
Law, Politics, and Taxonomy, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1263 (2010). 
 71. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939), abrogated by District of Columbia v. Heller, 
554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 72. See 26 U.S.C. § 5801–5872 (2006); see also infra Part II.C.1 (discussing the National 
Firearms Act). 
 73. Miller, 307 U.S. at 175. 
 74. Id. at 176. 
 75. Id. at 177. 
 76. Id. 
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barreled shotguns to militia purposes.77  In considering the history and 
intent behind the Second Amendment, the Miller Court noted that 
“ordinarily when called for service [militiamen during the late eighteenth 
century] were expected to appear bearing arms supplied by themselves 
and of the kind in common use at the time.”78  The sentence is not a 
holding; it merely suggests what was historically plausible for the type of 
“arms” that a citizen of the colonies was expected to own and bring to 
service—again, in the militia context only.  The words “self defense” do 
not appear in Miller; the only purpose discussed in the opinion is that of 
the “common defense,” which, once more, refers only to militia duty.79  
There is the suggestion that only weapons having “some reasonable 
relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia,” 
comprising “part of the ordinary military equipment,” and 
“contribut[ing] to the common defense” qualify for protection under the 
Second Amendment.80  Yet, as will be seen below, the Court has either 
wholly or principally abandoned these notions in recent years.  In their 
place is a single, unsatisfactory bit of Miller dicta: “in common use at the 
time.”81 
2. District of Columbia v. Heller 
In 2008, the Supreme Court decision District of Columbia v. Heller 
directly addressed the central question posed in this Comment: What are 
“arms” protected by the Second Amendment?  At issue was the 
constitutionality of a number of statutes unique to the District of 
Columbia, including a city-wide handgun ban82 and a requirement that all 
“long guns” be either “‘unloaded and disassembled or bound by a trigger 
lock or similar device’ unless they [we]re located in a place of business 
                                                          
 77. Id. at 178.  As Justice McReynolds explained: 
In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a ‘shotgun 
having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length’ at this time has some reasonable 
relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say 
that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument.  
Certainly it is not within judicial notice that this weapon is any part of the ordinary 
military equipment or that its use could contribute to the common defense. 
Id. (citing Aymette v. State, 20 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154, 158 (1840)). 
 78. Id. at 179. 
 79. See id. at 178–79. 
 80. See id. at 178 (citing Aymette, 20 Tenn. at 158). 
 81. Id. at 179. 
 82. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 574–75 (2008) (citing D.C. CODE §§ 7-
2501.01(12), 7-2502.01(a), 7-2502.02(a)(4) (2001)). 
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or [we]re being used for lawful recreational activities.”83  Though the 
District of Columbia authorized and expected Heller—a police officer—
to carry a handgun on duty, it denied his application for the permit 
required by city ordinances to lawfully possess a handgun at home.84 
Heller subsequently sought an injunction to prevent the city from 
enforcing these ordinances, claiming a violation of the Second 
Amendment.85  The district court dismissed the complaint, but the Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that the 
city ordinances at issue did, in fact, violate the Second Amendment.86 
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Justice Scalia wrote for the 
majority and examined the two traditional sides of Second Amendment 
debate.  One school of thought believes that this right extends “only to 
the right to possess and carry a firearm in connection with militia 
service,”87 while another argues for an “individual right to possess a 
firearm unconnected with service in a militia, and to use that arm for 
traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the home.”88  
Ultimately, the Court decided that the right to bear arms exists as an 
individual right, rather than one derived purely from militia service.89 
The ultimate outcome of the case, however, is less important for 
identifying “arms” than the process by which the Court arrived at the 
conclusion.  Specifically, the Court considered what “arms” were 
protected under the Second Amendment, giving rise to a number of 
important and, at times, seemingly contradictory points.  For one, it 
noted that “arms” did not only refer to weapons useful in a military 
setting, as had frequently been claimed.90  Additionally, and perhaps 
more importantly, the Court held that, much like the First and Fourth 
Amendments, the Second Amendment was not a static creature, 
constrained to protect only the types of arms that existed during the time 
of the Framers: “[T]he Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all 
instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in 
existence at the time of the founding.”91 
                                                          
 83. Id. at 575 (quoting D.C. CODE § 7-2507.02). 
 84. See id. 
 85. Id. at 575–76. 
 86. Id. at 576. 
 87. Id. at 577 (citing id. at 636–37 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Brief for Petitioners, Heller, 554 
U.S. 570 (No. 07-290)). 
 88. Id. at 577 (citing Respondent’s Brief, Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (No. 07-290)). 
 89. Id. at 594–95. 
 90. Id. at 581–83, 624–25. 
 91. Id. at 582. 
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By itself, this raises a number of issues.  While it would, perhaps, be 
unrealistic to suggest that the Framers intended to limit the scope of the 
Second Amendment to rudimentary muskets, the scope chosen by the 
Court—“all instruments that constitute bearable arms”92—is broad in the 
extreme.  It neither imposes an upper limit to the destructive power of 
arms protected under the Second Amendment nor helps define “arms” 
any more than to say that they extend well beyond single-shot muzzle-
loading flintlock muskets, which has long been assumed anyway. 
Fortunately, the Court did not leave the analysis of “arms” there.  
Looking to United States v. Miller,93 it concluded that “the sorts of 
weapons protected were those ‘in common use at the time.’”94  
Additionally, under Miller, the Court concluded that the Second 
Amendment does not extend to “weapons not typically possessed by law-
abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns.”95  
The Court then suggested that this excludes “dangerous and unusual 
weapons,” despite the inescapable conclusion that their dangerous or 
unusual characteristics prevent them from being “in common use” in the 
first place.96  In the following paragraph, the Court noted that, although 
automatic weapons may be most useful from a military standpoint—and, 
indeed, that “no amount of small arms could be useful against modern-
day bombers and tanks”—these are not analogous to the “sorts of lawful 
weapons” owned by militiamen of the eighteenth century.97 
Thus, the Court’s language suggests two conclusions by implication.  
First, “bombers and tanks” are not protected “arms” under the Second 
Amendment,98 which finally sets a rough upper limit on “arms.”  Second, 
the only lawful arms protected by the Second Amendment are those 
“small arms” analogous to the “sorts of lawful weapons that [eighteenth-
century militiamen] possessed at home.”99  As a secondary effect, this 
essentially limits the militia of the modern day to vastly inferior weapons 
relative to anything they would possibly face from any foreign invading 
army; yet, according to the Court, “the fact that modern developments 
                                                          
 92. Id. 
 93. 307 U.S. 174 (1939), abrogated by Heller, 554 U.S. 570; see supra Part II.B.1. 
 94. Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 (quoting Miller, 307 U.S. at 179). 
 95. Id. at 625. 
 96. Id. at 627 (internal quotation marks omitted).  This analysis opens the problem of circular 
reasoning.  See infra Part III.A.1. 
 97. Heller, 554 U.S. at 627–28. 
 98. See id. 
 99. See id. 
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have limited the degree of fit between the prefatory clause and the 
protected right cannot change our interpretation of the right.”100  Whether 
this effective hamstringing of the militia is desirable, or even proper in 
light of the realities of modern warfare, remains to be seen. 
Despite the uncertainties and generalities of the discussion of arms in 
Heller, it is possible, at the very least, to ascertain a number of standards 
in order to determine whether a specific instrument receives protection 
under the Second Amendment: the weapon must be “in common use” at 
the time;101 it must not be “dangerous and unusual”;102 while it need not 
be created specifically for a military purpose, it must not be a type of 
weapon “not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful 
purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns”;103 and it must be at least 
roughly analogous to the type of weapons owned by an eighteenth-
century militiaman, though this by no means provides an absolute 
technological limitation.104  There is also the suggestion that protected 
“arms” are limited to small arms,105 but the Court neither elaborates on 
nor repeats this. 
The precise usefulness of these criteria in answering the “arms” 
question remains to be seen.106  Despite the appearance of reasonableness 
on their face, one must consider these criteria in light of the 
developments in weapons technology over the past two-and-a-half 
centuries.  One must wonder, in light of the preceding discussion, 
whether the Framers would have been so generous in their broad and 
undefined protection of “arms” had they foreseen the extent of the 
impending developments in technology. 
3. McDonald v. City of Chicago 
In 2010’s McDonald v. City of Chicago, the Supreme Court again 
expanded the scope of the Second Amendment.107  The plaintiffs—
several Chicago-area citizens—sought to own and keep handguns for 
                                                          
 100. Id. at 627–28. 
 101. Id. at 627 (quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939). 
 102. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 103. Id. at 625. 
 104. See id. at 627–28 (analogizing machine guns to arms used by eighteenth-century 
militiamen). 
 105. Id. at 627. 
 106. For discussion of the “common use” standard, see infra Part III. 
 107. 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3076 (2010) (holding that “the Second Amendment right is fully applicable 
to the States”). 
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lawful self-defense, but a city-wide ban on these weapons prevented 
them from doing so.108  Because of the long-held understanding that the 
Bill of Rights did not automatically apply against the states, the 
proponents of the ban argued that it was indeed constitutional under 
Illinois law.109  Rejecting that argument, a plurality of the Court instead 
held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
incorporates the Second Amendment against the states.110 
The Court again affirmed most of Heller, and thus, the opinion 
warrants little direct discussion here; although, once more, the Court 
stated that “self-defense [is] ‘the central component of the right [to keep 
and bear arms] itself.’”111  This again suggests that weapons that have a 
strong “self-defense” use may be protected as “arms” by the Second 
Amendment, though this is not stated within the opinion itself. 
Of somewhat greater importance is the inevitable problem of federal 
preemption.  Before McDonald, the Second Amendment only applied to 
the federal government.112  Individual state provisions solely governed 
the states, and federal laws could not preempt those of the states.113  
Thus, the power to regulate arms was, at least partially, reserved to the 
states as a police power.114  Now that both state and federal laws are 
accountable to the same source of law—the Second Amendment—it is 
possible for federal preemption of state laws when laws conflict.115  
Accordingly, and because the topic of state laws has been covered 
elsewhere,116 this Comment will discuss only federal laws on the matter. 
                                                          
 108. Id. 
 109. See id. at 3028. 
 110. Id. at 3050 (plurality opinion). 
 111. Id. at 3048 (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 599 (2008)). 
 112. Id. at 3114 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 113. Id. 
 114. See id. (“Finally, even apart from the States’ long history of firearms regulation and its 
location at the core of their police powers, this is a quintessential area in which federalism ought to 
be allowed to flourish without this Court’s meddling.”). 
 115. Although the Court has declined to explicitly address the preemption of state gun laws by 
federal gun laws, it has discussed the potential for actual conflict between two sets of law: 
[S]tate law is pre-empted to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law.  Thus, 
the Court has found pre-emption where it is impossible for a private party to comply with 
both state and federal requirements or where state law “stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” 
English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990) (citations omitted) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 
312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)) (citing Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 
(1963)). 
 116. See supra note 70. 
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C. Overview of Statutes Restricting the Ownership and Use of Arms 
Although numerous states regulate weapon ownership and use, most 
of these laws, if not all, are now vulnerable to attack in the aftermath of 
McDonald.117  Given the nature of federal preemption, because the same 
law—the Second Amendment—binds both federal and state law, federal 
law will prevail when it conflicts with state law.118  Therefore, this 
Comment will only explore the two federal statues that currently provide 
the bulwark of weapon-related statutory law: the National Firearms Act 
of 1934 and the Gun Control Act of 1968. 
1. The National Firearms Act of 1934 
The National Firearms Act (NFA) of 1934 sought to curtail the 
manufacture and transfer of certain firearms by taxing importers, 
manufacturers, and dealers and proposing mandatory firearm 
registration, and it placed a number of restrictions on what arms are and 
are not permissible.119  Given both the NFA’s seventy-eight-year lifespan 
and that the constitutionality of the NFA itself was challenged in 
Miller—albeit only as it related to the regulation of sawed-off 
shotguns120—it is plausible that the majority of provisions contained 
within it are, in fact, valid under the Second Amendment.  One can, thus, 
draw a few implicit conclusions regarding the permissibility of certain 
restrictions on “arms” by taking a cursory glance at the NFA: (1) it is 
permissible to restrict, or at least regulate, “making” a firearm under the 
meaning of the NFA;121 (2) it is permissible to regulate “firearms” as 
defined by the NFA, which includes eight classes of weapons;122 (3) 
                                                          
 117. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3020. 
 118. See id. at 3050.  As the Court conceded, 
[I]ncorporation of the Second Amendment right will to some extent limit the legislative 
freedom of the States, but this is always true when a Bill of Rights provision is 
incorporated.  Incorporation always restricts experimentation and local variations, but 
that has not stopped the Court from incorporating virtually every other provision of the 
Bill of Rights. 
Id. 
 119. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801–5872 (2006). 
 120. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 121. Under the NFA, “making” a firearm includes “manufacturing (other than by one qualified to 
engage in such business under this chapter), putting together, altering, any combination of these, or 
otherwise producing a firearm.”  26 U.S.C. § 5845(i). 
 122. “Firearms” subject to NFA regulation and a mandatory $200 registration tax include (1) a 
shotgun with a barrel shorter than eighteen inches, (2) a weapon made from a shotgun with either a 
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specifically excluded from the definition of “firearms” are antique 
devices;123 and (4) specifically excluded from the definition of 
“destructive device[s] are shotguns, “which the Secretary finds [are] 
generally recognized as particularly suitable for sporting purposes” 
despite having a bore of more than one-half inch.124 
Ultimately, the NFA does not actually prohibit ownership of any 
weapons; so long as the owner pays the tax under § 5811(a) or § 5821(a) 
and registers the weapon under § 5841, he may own that weapon.  As 
part of Title 26, however, the NFA is a tax section; while it does not 
impose an outright prohibition on the making of a sawed-off shotgun or 
the purchase of a massive Boys .55 Caliber Anti Tank Rifle,125 the 
inclusion of such weapons suggests that it is permissible for a state or 
subsequent federal law to tighten the regulations concerning them.  As 
explained in the next section, some federal laws have already done just 
that. 
2. The Gun Control Act of 1968 and the Firearm Owners’ Protection 
Act of 1986 
Unlike the NFA, the Gun Control Act (GCA) of 1968, which was 
amended by the Firearm Owners’ Protection Act of 1986, specifically 
criminalized the use and sale of certain types of weapons and 
ammunition.126  Additionally, it directly addressed the preemption 
question by stating that, while it does not purport to occupy the field, it 
will preempt state law where “there is a direct and positive conflict 
between such provision and the law of the State so that the two cannot be 
reconciled or consistently stand together.”127  Among the weapons 
prohibited are (1) machine guns,128 (2) destructive devices,129 (3) short-
                                                                                                                       
barrel shorter than eighteen inches or an overall length of less than twenty-six inches, (3) a rifle with 
a barrel shorter than sixteen inches, (4) a weapon made from a rifle with either a barrel shorter than 
sixteen inches or a total length below twenty-six inches, (5) “any other weapon” as defined in 
§ 5845(e), (6) a “machine gun” defined in § 5845(b), (7) any silencer as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 921 
(2006), and (8) a destructive device as defined by 26 U.S.C. § 5845(f)).  26 U.S.C. § 5845(a). 
 123. See 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a). 
 124. Id. § 5845(f)(2). 
 125. See id. (identifying as a “destructive device” all weapons that “have a bore of more than 
one-half inch in diameter” except for weapons that are “particularly suitable for sporting purposes”). 
 126. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 921–931.  Title 18 is the “Crimes and Criminal Procedure” section of the 
Code. 
 127. § 927. 
 128. § 922(a)(4), (b)(4), (o).  Note that subsection (o) allows legal transfer or possession of 
machine guns owned before 1968 without requiring registration under federal law.  § 922(o)(2)(B). 
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barreled shotguns,130 (4) short-barreled rifles,131 (5) armor-piercing 
ammunition,132 and (6) guns undetectable by metal detectors.133  There 
are exceptions and qualifications to most of these provisions, but suffice 
it to say that all are heavily regulated under the GCA. 
By synthesizing the two Acts, one may conclude that weapons such 
as those banned under these Acts probably do not meet the constitutional 
definition of “arms” under the Second Amendment and are not, 
therefore, protected.  At least in the case of short-barreled shotguns, the 
Court has explicitly found as much;134 in the case of the others, the long 
judicial silence on the matter appears to have already decided the 
question.  Part III will analyze the weapons alongside the potential 
criteria derived from Heller, as discussed above in Part II.B.2. 
Notably absent from either the NFA or the GCA are so-called 
“expanding” bullets—like soft-point or hollow-point bullets—that, upon 
contact with a target, broaden to create a wound far larger and more 
traumatic than other bullets of comparable caliber.135  Interestingly, such 
bullets are notorious for actually decreasing the penetration power of a 
round, while armor-piercing bullets—such as those prohibited by the 
GCA—are designed as a heavier round capable of punching through 
body armor.136  One might argue that, with greater stopping power, an 
expanding bullet is of more use for self-defense purposes than a round 
specifically intended to penetrate armor,137 yet each are highly lethal in 
their own right.  Indeed, at least since the Hague Convention of 1899, 
numerous nations have decried the use of expanding bullets in warfare.138  
While this has no legal bearing on the current status of the bullets in the 
United States, it suggests an abhorrence or revulsion to the round that 
                                                                                                                       
 129. § 922(a)(4), (b)(4). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. § 922(a)(7)–(8), (b)(5). 
 133. § 922(p)(1)(A). 
 134. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939), abrogated by District of Columbia v. 
Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 135. Round Point vs Hollow Point Bullets, FirstScienceTV, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v= 
MrZbjQe8XRU (last visited Nov. 5, 2011) (explaining the mechanics of hollow-point bullets). 
 136. See A. HUNSICKER, ADVANCED SKILLS IN EXECUTIVE PROTECTION 249 (2010) (“The 
[hollow point] bullet is more effective in its stopping power, but less likely to hit innocent by-
standers because of over-penetration of the target.  Full-metal-jacket bullets and other non-
expanding bullets are in a sense less effective than hollow-point bullets, because of over-
penetration.”). 
 137. See id. 
 138. See Hague Expanding Bullets Declaration, supra note 54. 
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may—but does not necessarily—lead to the conclusion that it is 
“dangerous or unusual” and unworthy of protection by the Second 
Amendment. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. The Heller Standards 
1. “In Common Use” 
Central to the standards applied in Heller is the requirement that a 
weapon must be “in common use at the time.”139  Indeed, the Court goes 
so far as to note that “[t]he handgun ban amounts to a prohibition of an 
entire class of ‘arms’ that is overwhelmingly chosen by American society 
for [a] lawful purpose.”140  The Court continues by observing that 
“handguns are the most popular weapon chosen by Americans for self-
defense in the home, and a complete prohibition of their use is 
invalid.”141 
This emphasis on popularity is troubling.  By basing an important 
constitutional right on the vicissitudes of popular opinion, rather than a 
consistent, objective standard, the Court has effectively subjugated the 
Bill of Rights to the whim of consumer demand.  Should a new, more 
deadly weapon grow in popularity, it stands to reason that it, too, might 
find its way into the safe harbor created by the “common use” standard.  
Under this standard, the Court placed no emphasis on the inherent 
capabilities of the weapon itself; it considered only the number of such 
weapons used by the public.142  Applying this principle to the worldwide 
stage, the ubiquitous Kalashnikov assault rifles—the family of guns 
including the AK-47 and other automatics143—would theoretically find 
themselves protected as overwhelmingly commonly used weapons.  Yet, 
                                                          
 139. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627 (2008) (“We also recognize another 
important limitation on the right to keep and carry arms.  Miller said, as we have explained, that the 
sorts of weapons protected were those ‘in common use at the time.’” (quoting United States v. 
Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939))). 
 140. Id. at 628. 
 141. Id. at 629. 
 142. As Justice Stevens observed, “The Court struck down the District of Columbia’s handgun 
ban not because of the utility of handguns for lawful self-defense, but rather because of their 
popularity for that purpose.”  McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3107 n.33 (2010) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 628). 
 143. See C.J. CHIVERS, THE GUN: THE AK-47 AND THE EVOLUTION OF WAR 4–8 (2010) 
(describing the weapon’s immense popularity during the ongoing “Kalashnikov Era”). 
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the GCA clearly prohibits Kalashnikovs as automatic weapons144 and 
does not contemplate their popularity worldwide. 
This raises the second problem with the common use standard.  If the 
Second Amendment does not protect a weapon until it enters common 
use, then how can any new weapon ever enter common use in the first 
place?  Put another way, if the government may ban all weapons until 
they enter common use, then these weapons cannot be lawfully sold 
despite their otherwise favorable characteristics and will never become 
commonly used by the public.  This effectively freezes technological 
improvements in weapons by restricting protected arms to those weapons 
in common use today.  Even if a superior weapon for self-defense 
purposes entered production tomorrow, the fact that it was not in 
common use today would place it outside the protection of the Second 
Amendment—at least under this element of the Heller standard. 
2.  “Dangerous and Unusual” 
The Heller Court stated that the common use standard “is fairly 
supported by the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of 
‘dangerous and unusual weapons.’”145  This is problematic in 
determining which weapons receive constitutional protection, however.  
In addition to redundancy with the common use standard—a weapon’s 
“unusual” status reflects directly upon its common usage—it is also 
vague to the point of meaninglessness.  All weapons are dangerous.  If a 
particular weapon was not dangerous, then there would be little use for it 
in the first place.  The average citizen, after all, could not fight off an 
assailant with a water pistol; he must have the means to defend himself 
using a dangerous weapon. 
More useful than merely prohibiting dangerous weapons, however, is 
an objective test for assessing relative levels of possible danger in any 
given weapon.  Indeed, courts have applied a similar rationale for more 
than three-quarters of a century.146  It is an elementary principle that not 
all weapons are created equal in the harm they produce.  A machine gun, 
for instance, is capable of generating a far greater volume of fire than a 
handgun.  A knife, likewise, can harm only a single person at a time, yet 
                                                          
 144. See supra Part II.C.2. 
 145. Heller, 554 U.S. at 627. 
 146. See, e.g., People v. Brown, 235 N.W. 245, 246 (Mich. 1931) (en banc) (“Some arms, 
although they have a valid use for the protection of the state by organized and instructed soldiery in 
times of war or riot, are too dangerous to be kept in a settled community by individuals . . . .”). 
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a single modern fragmentation grenade can kill all targets in a five-meter 
radius and wound targets up to fifteen meters away.147  All of these 
weapons are dangerous in the sense that they can all harm or kill.  Yet, 
they differ markedly in the numbers of people they can kill in the same 
span of time.  A limitation on the level of danger, then, is radically more 
useful to any discussion of constitutional limitations on protected arms 
than a blanket prohibition on dangerous weapons.  This will be a key 
feature of this Comment’s suggested framework for determining the 
protected status of arms in the future. 
3. “Not Typically Possessed by Law-Abiding Citizens for Lawful 
Purposes” 
The Heller Court also stated that “the Second Amendment does not 
protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for 
lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns.”148  Although the use 
of the word “typically” echoes the common use issues noted above, the 
second part of the sentence states a consideration that, though somewhat 
amorphous at present, is nevertheless useful as a guide to understanding 
the limits of “arms.”  The Court stated that “lawful purposes” include 
self-defense and defense of the home, which at the time of the Framers 
also implied that militia service was an additional lawful purpose.149 
Ignoring the “typically” language, the question then becomes: What 
weapons are useful for lawful purposes such as those articulated in the 
opinion?  Again, courts and legal scholars have long noted this 
consideration, though its specifics remain unclear.150  Any weapon may 
be used for unlawful purposes, but the average home defender 
                                                          
 147. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, INITIAL ENTRY TRAINING SOLDIER’S HANDBOOK 158 tbl.6-7 (2008), 
available at http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/p600-4.pdf. 
 148. Heller, 554 U.S. at 625 (interpreting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939)). 
 149. See id. at 623–25.  The Court noted that “[i]n the colonial and revolutionary war era, [small-
arms] weapons used by militiamen and weapons used in defense of person and home were one and 
the same.”  Id. at 624–25 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Kessler, 614 P.2d 94, 98 (1980)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 150. See, e.g., Brown, 235 N.W. at 246 (“Some arms . . . find their use by bands of criminals and 
have legitimate employment only by guards and police.  Some weapons are adapted and recognized 
by the common opinion of good citizens as proper for private defense of person and property.  
Others are the peculiar tools of the criminal.”); Emery, supra note 5, at 473 (“The greater deadliness 
of small firearms . . . , the alarming frequency of homicides and felonious assaults with such arms, 
the evolution of a distinct class of criminals known as ‘gunmen’ from their ready use of such 
weapons for criminal purposes, are [raising] the question of the reason, scope, and limitation of the 
constitutional guaranty of a right to keep and bear arms . . . .”). 
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presumably has little use for a bazooka or a machine gun.  One must 
limit lawful self-defense, then, to a finite, as-yet-undetermined amount of 
force.  Though no legal mechanism exists to determine the maximum 
amount of force necessary for lawful self-defense under Heller, a 
consideration of the dangerousness of a weapon is the most logical 
analytical device to apply, for reasons that will be discussed further.151 
The purpose of any particular weapon is another important 
consideration in determining the extent of its “lawful” character.  
Although many states have enacted concealed-carry laws relating to 
handguns,152 these laws do not exempt one from the prohibition on 
carrying a short-barreled shotgun or rifle under the GCA.  As will be 
discussed shortly, part of the attractiveness of a sawed-off shotgun is the 
ease by which one may deploy the gun from a hidden place at a 
moment’s notice—a feature long associated with criminal activity.153  
Likewise, a firearm silencer154 exists solely to quiet the noise produced 
by a gunshot—a purpose generally associated with illicit activities.  The 
average home-defender has no need for a silenced shot; if he lawfully 
discharges his weapon at an intruder, his action does not need 
concealment.  Yet an assassin may benefit greatly from a silent shot, as it 
allows him to fire without alerting anyone to the noise normally 
produced by a gun.  Thus, a character of unlawfulness can be imputed to 
the use of silencers, as demonstrated by the heavy punishment levied on 
those who use them to commit crimes under federal law.155 
These examples demonstrate a few weapons that do not relate to 
lawful purposes, but they fail to suggest a concrete test to determine 
which weapons do.  One may suppose that the more utility a weapon 
represents to a self- or home-defender, while at the same time producing 
                                                          
 151. See Part III.D. 
 152. See Bill Thompson, Stearn’s Gun Bill Moving Along, GAINESVILLE SUN, Oct. 27, 2011, 
www.gainesville.com/article/20111027/ARTICLES/111029614?p=1&tc=pg (noting that as of 
November, 2011, forty-nine states will permit the carrying of concealed weapons). 
 153. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 154. The GCA defines “firearm silencer” as “any device for silencing, muffling, or diminishing 
the report of a portable firearm, including any combination of parts, designed or redesigned, and 
intended for use in assembling or fabricating a firearm silencer or firearm muffler, and any part 
intended only for use in such assembly or fabrication.”  18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(24) (2006). 
 155. See § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii) (setting a minimum sentence of thirty years in prison for possession 
of a firearm with a silencer under this subsection); § 924(c)(1)(C)(ii) (setting a sentence of life 
imprisonment for a second violation of this subsection for possession or use of a destructive device, 
a machine gun, or a firearm equipped with a silencer); § 924(o) (allowing a maximum sentence of 
life imprisonment for a conviction of conspiracy to commit a crime with a destructive device, a 
machine gun, or a firearm equipped with a silencer). 
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less use for purely criminal activities, the more likely the weapon will 
satisfy the “lawful purposes” prong under the Heller test.  Low 
destructive potential, low emphasis on concealment, and low 
attractiveness for illicit purposes may all be important factors to consider 
in applying this test.  At present, however, the current test does not 
provide enough definite guidance to deduce exactly which weapons are 
used for “lawful purposes” and which are not. 
4. Analogous to Weapons Possessed by Eighteenth-Century Militiamen 
The Heller Court quickly dismissed the notion that the Second 
Amendment protected only those weapons in existence in the eighteenth 
century156 and withheld protection for weapons that are “useful in 
warfare.”157  It went on to suggest that only weapons analogous to the 
kinds of arms owned by eighteenth-century militiamen at home receive 
protection by the Second Amendment.158  This is not a limitation on the 
degree of the technological advancement of the weapon, but rather of a 
weapon’s similarity to the kinds available for civilian use at the time.159  
Presumably, this would include rifles, swords, knives, and pistols, along 
with blunt instruments and other similar tools, while excluding 
flamethrowers, artillery, machine guns, poison gas, tanks, nuclear 
                                                          
 156. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 582 (2008) (“Some have made the argument, 
bordering on the frivolous, that only those arms in existence in the 18th century are protected by the 
Second Amendment.  We do not interpret constitutional rights that way.”). 
 157. Id. at 624 (“Read in isolation, Miller’s phrase ‘part of ordinary military equipment’ could 
mean that only those weapons useful in warfare are protected.  That would be a startling reading of 
the opinion, since it would mean that the National Firearms Act’s restrictions on machine guns (not 
challenged in Miller) might be unconstitutional . . . .” (quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 
178 (1939)). 
 158. Id. at 627–28. 
It may be objected that if weapons that are most useful in military service―M-16 rifles 
and the like—may be banned, then the Second Amendment right is completely detached 
from the prefatory clause.  But as we have said, the conception of the militia at the time 
of the Second Amendment’s ratification was the body of all citizens capable of military 
service, who would bring the sorts of lawful weapons that they possessed at home to 
militia duty.  It may well be true today that a militia, to be as effective as militias in the 
18th century, would require sophisticated arms that are highly unusual in society at large.  
Indeed, it may be true that no amount of small arms could be useful against modern-day 
bombers and tanks.  But the fact that modern developments have limited the degree of fit 
between the prefatory clause and the protected right cannot change our interpretation of 
the right. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 159. See id. at 581 (“The term [arms] was applied, then as now, to weapons that were not 
specifically designed for military use and were not employed in a military capacity.”). 
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ordnance, and other such weapon groups.  The purposes of lawful self-
defense are not restricted by limiting “arms” to semi-automatic long arms 
and pistols, under this test, because such weapons are of a similar—
albeit, radically more advanced—kind to those possessed by the men 
who formed the early American militias. 
The trouble with this test, however, is that it accomplishes precisely 
what the Court purported to avoid: a freeze on technological 
innovation.160  There were no “nonlethal” weapons in the eighteenth-
century such as modern Tasers or pepper spray;161 thus, under this factor 
of analysis, such weapons—though useful for self-defense purposes—
fall outside the protections of the Second Amendment.162  As this result 
essentially strips citizens of any definite legal right to purchase and use 
nonlethal weapons for the same lawful purposes suggested by the Court 
above, this test should be modified—or, at the very least, should be made 
subordinate to the other three considerations discussed above.163  As 
argued in Part III.D, this portion of the test should not consider the type 
of weapon possessed by eighteenth-century militiamen, but rather it 
should compare the destructive potential of a modern weapon to those 
possessed in the United States in the 1790s. 
B. An Application of the Heller Standards to Certain Weapons 
Prohibited or Regulated by the Gun Control Act of 1968 
In appraising the usefulness of the Heller standards, it is appropriate 
to apply them to some of the weapons currently prohibited under federal 
law.  Some factors are far more useful than others in defining the limits 
of Second Amendment protection. 
1. Short-Barreled Shotguns and Rifles 
The GCA bans any shotgun with a barrel length of less than eighteen 
inches or an overall length of less than twenty-six inches.164  Similarly, 
                                                          
 160. See id. at 582. 
 161. See NEIL DAVISON, ‘NON-LETHAL’ WEAPONS 1–6 (Jim Whitman ed., 2009) (discussing the 
initial development of nonlethal weapons during the 1970s). 
 162. See infra Part III.C. 
 163. See supra Parts III.A.1–3. 
 164. See 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(6) (2006) (defining a “short-barreled shotgun” as a shotgun that has 
a barrel length of less than eighteen inches or a weapon made from a shotgun with an overall length 
of less than twenty-six inches); § 922(a)(4), (b)(4) (banning short-barreled shotguns). 
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rifles must be neither shorter than twenty-six inches nor have a barrel 
over sixteen inches in length to be lawful.165  Although a loophole exists 
for rifled weapons and shotguns not designed to be fired from the 
shoulder,166 the GCA effectively prohibits “sawed-off” shotguns and 
rifles.  The Supreme Court has stated expressly that sawed-off shotguns 
are not constitutionally protected “arms” under the Second 
Amendment.167  As a definitely prohibited class of weapons, it is useful 
to apply the Heller standards to short-barreled shotguns and rifles to 
further define the extent of constitutional protections on “arms.” 
Sawed-off shotguns are not “in common use” because they have 
been illegal since 1968.168  They are “unusual” for this reason as well, 
but they are not significantly more “dangerous” than full-length rifles or 
shotguns.169  Sawed-off shotguns resemble the old blunderbuss-type 
weapons of the highwayman,170 while short-barreled rifles are little more 
than high-powered pistols, both of which are analogous to weapons 
existing in the eighteenth century. 
Only the final criteria—“not typically possessed by law-abiding 
citizens for lawful purposes”171—provides disapproval for the short-
barreled weapons under the Heller standards.  A commonly cited 
purpose for shortening a shotgun or rifle barrel is the ease of concealing 
                                                          
 165. § 921(a)(8) (defining a “short-barreled rifle” as having a barrel length of less than sixteen 
inches or any weapon made from a rifle with an overall length of less than twenty-six inches); 
§ 922(a)(4), (b)(4) (banning short-barreled rifles). 
 166. Both rifles and shotguns, as defined by the GCA, include only weapons “intended to be 
fired from the shoulder.”  See § 921(a)(5), (a)(7).  Therefore, weapons possessing rifling or firing 
shotgun shells that were originally designed to be fired with a pistol grip, with no butt stock at the 
end of the weapon, do not meet the definitions of “rifle” or “shotgun” and can have a barrel of any 
length. 
 167. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939), abrogated by District of Columbia v. 
Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).  As the Court explained: 
In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a ‘shotgun 
having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length’ at this time has some reasonable 
relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say 
that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument. 
Id. 
 168. § 922(b)(4). 
 169. Shorter shotgun barrels have been found to create a wider burst of buckshot at close 
proximity, but this does not occur with all cartridges.  See Terry S. Moreau et al., Pellet Patterns 
Fired by Sawed-Off Shotguns, 30 J. FORENSIC SCI. 137, 146–47 (1985). 
 170. A “blunderbuss” is “a short gun with a large bore, firing many balls or slugs, and capable of 
execution within a limited range without exact aim.”  II OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 332 (2d ed. 
1989). 
 171. Heller, 554 U.S. at 625 (interpreting Miller, 307 U.S. 174). 
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the weapon.172  This enables criminals to hide a high-powered weapon 
until the very moment they commit the actual crime.  Combined with the 
devastating close-quarter power of the shotgun, a readily concealable 
weapon is highly attractive to a prospective assailant.173 
The Miller Court applied a different criterion in determining that no 
constitutional protection exists for sawed-off shotguns: possession of 
them lacks “some reasonable relationship to the preservation or 
efficiency of a well regulated militia.”174  While Heller has largely 
rendered the militia question moot,175 it is interesting to note the 
discrepancy between the pure militia-based approach of the older opinion 
and the newer rationales. 
2. Machine Guns 
A machine gun, as defined by the NFA and incorporated into the 
GCA, is any weapon that fires “automatically more than one shot, 
without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger.” 176  
Currently, the GCA prohibits civilian use of only machine guns built 
after 1986; those built before are still available, subject to the provisions 
of the NFA.177  Heller heavily implied that regulations on machine guns 
were constitutionally permissible and, thus, that the weapons fall outside 
the range of Second Amendment protected “arms.”178  Before applying 
                                                          
 172. E.g. Moreau, supra note 169, at 137 (“Criminals frequently shorten the barrels of rifles and 
shotguns to make them easier to conceal.”). 
 173. See MARIANNE W. ZAWITZ, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUNS USED IN CRIME 1 (1995), 
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/GUIC.PDF (“Surveys of inmates show that they 
prefer concealable, large caliber guns.”). 
 174. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178. 
 175. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 622 (“This holding is not only consistent with, but positively 
suggests, that the Second Amendment confers an individual right to keep and bear arms (though only 
arms that ‘have some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated 
militia’).” (quoting Miller, 307 U.S. at 178)).  It is interesting that the Heller opinion derives an 
“individual right” from the Miller opinion when the latter clearly considers the common defense.  
See Miller, 307 U.S. at 178 (“Certainly it is not within judicial notice that this weapon is any part of 
the ordinary military equipment or that its use could contribute to the common defense.”) (citing 
Aymette v. State, 20 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 194, 158 (1840)).  This issue falls outside the scope of this 
Comment. 
 176. National Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C. 5845(b) (2006), cited in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(23) (2006). 
 177. 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(4), (o). 
 178. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 624 (“Read in isolation, Miller’s phrase ‘part of ordinary military 
equipment’ could mean that only those weapons useful in warfare are protected.  That would be a 
startling reading of the opinion, since it would mean that the National Firearms Act’s restrictions on 
machine guns (not challenged in Miller) might be unconstitutional . . . .” (quoting Miller, 307 U.S. at 
178)). 
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the Heller factors to this class of weapons, one must presume that they 
do not, in fact, fall within the scope of the Second Amendment. 
Although machine guns have been largely regulated since 1968,179 
over 240,000 were lawfully registered with civilians as of 1995.180  
Whether this is enough to classify these automatic weapons as “in 
common use” is unclear, unfortunately.  As noted above, this also 
suggests uncertainty regarding whether the weapon is “unusual” or 
“typically” used for lawful purposes.  Indeed, relatively few crimes are 
committed with automatic weapons compared to handguns,181 though 
this may have more to do with the limited availability of machine guns 
than the desirability of their characteristics.182 
Because even early weapons classified as machine guns could fire 
several hundreds of rounds per minute,183 one could consider them 
“dangerous”—but, as previously stated, this says little by itself, since all 
weapons are meant to be “dangerous.”184  By applying a consideration of 
“dangerousness” relative to the weapons possessed by eighteenth-century 
militiamen, however, it becomes clear that modern automatic weapons 
are orders of magnitude beyond the “Brown Bess” in terms of their 
capabilities.185  And while one may contend that basing a consideration 
of “dangerousness” solely upon rate of fire is a purely academic fiction, 
history dictates otherwise.186  Thus, although most of the Heller 
                                                          
 179. There are several ways to acquire a machine gun legally under federal law, such as 
purchasing a machine gun that was manufactured before 1986 and paying a $200 tax.  See § 922(o). 
 180. ZAWITZ, supra note 173, at 4. 
 181. See id. at 1 (“Although most crime is not committed with guns, most gun crime is 
committed with handguns.”). 
 182. This supposition is based on long-standing restrictions on machine guns under federal law.  
See supra note 177 and accompanying text. 
 183. See, e.g., The Maxim Automatic Machine Gun, supra note 45, at 350. 
 184. See supra Part III.A.2. 
 185. While eighteenth-century muskets produced up to three shots per minute, see supra Part 
II.A.1, a top-of-the-line M134 “Minigun” can churn out three to four thousand rounds per minute.  1 
TAE-WOO LEE, MILITARY TECHNOLOGIES OF THE WORLD 118 (2009).  Because these weapons were 
in production before 1986, it is theoretically possible that some are lawfully owned by civilians 
today.  See, e.g., MICHAEL GREEN & GREY STEWART, WEAPONS OF THE MODERN MARINES 41 
(2004) (describing the development of the M134 for use during the Vietnam War).  It is odd that, at 
least under federal law, civilians could own such a weapon. 
 186. For a particularly moving account of the terrible power of machine guns during the Battle of 
the Somme in World War I, see ELLEN SCHOECK, I WAS THERE: A CENTURY OF ALUMNI STORIES 
ABOUT THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA, 1906–2006 at 139 (2006).  George Coppard, a gunner at the 
battle, recalls his experience: 
The next morning [July 2] we gunners surveyed the dreadful scene in front of us . . . .  It 
became clear that the Germans always had a commanding view of No Man’s land.  [The 
British] attack had been brutally repulsed.  Hundreds of dead were strung out like 
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standards are unclear as to the status of machine guns, their extremely 
dangerous character likely places them outside the scope of the Second 
Amendment. 
3. Destructive Devices 
The term “destructive devices,” as defined in the GCA, serves as a 
catchall category for non-antique propellant weapons excluding 
shotguns, rifled weapons with a bore diameter of less than one-half inch, 
and small pyrotechnic devices.187  This classification includes bombs, 
grenades, rockets, mines, and non-antique non-shotguns with a bore 
diameter greater than one-half inch.188  This encompasses too many items 
to address individually, but the very name of the category suggests the 
primary consideration central to their regulation: dangerousness.  Each of 
these weapons, possibly excluding large-caliber rifled weapons,189 is 
presumably capable of killing or maiming multiple people at once by 
itself.  Additionally, the typical “lawful citizen” presumably has little 
need for the killing power represented by a grenade or bomb; such items 
cannot readily be employed for self- or home-defense purposes.  Even 
without considering the “common use” factor, it is apparent from the 
preceding discussion of machine guns that the “danger” factor alone may 
render a weapon worthy of regulation.190  Thus, weapons in the 
“destructive device” category—except, perhaps, large-caliber weapons—
are likely not Second Amendment “arms.” 
Large-caliber weapons, however, constitute a dilemma.  Unlike 
bombs and other explosives, this category of weapons actually does have 
a legitimate use: hunting.191  For reasons discussed below, however, 
                                                                                                                       
wreckage washed up to a high water-mark.  Quite as many died on the enemy wire as on 
the ground, like fish caught in the net.  They hung there in grotesque postures.  Some 
looked as if they were praying; they had died on their knees and the wire had prevented 
their fall.  Machine gun fire had done its terrible work. 
Id. (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 187. See 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(4) (2006). 
 188. § 921(a)(4)(A)–(B). 
 189. Criminals nevertheless prefer large caliber rifled weapons to smaller caliber weapons.  See 
ZAWITZ, supra note 173, at 1 (“Surveys of inmates show that they prefer concealable, large caliber 
guns. . . .  Studies of the guns used in homicides show that large caliber revolvers are the most 
frequent type of gun used in homicides . . . .”).  “Rifled” in this context refers to the modern rifling 
on most guns, not rifle weapons themselves as defined in the Gun Control Act or other legislation. 
 190. See supra Part III.B.2. 
 191. See, e.g., Way Out There, FIELD & STREAM, Feb. 2007, at 69, 72.  As described by one 
hunter, “They go rigid when the bullet hits, and then they simply drop.  We’ve never lost an animal 
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large-caliber ammunition effectively fits into a similar category as 
another, presumably legitimately, regulated category of weapons: armor-
piercing ammunition. 
4. Armor-Piercing, High-Caliber, and Expanding Ammunition 
The GCA prohibits the manufacture, sale, and delivery of armor-
piercing ammunition.192  Exceptions exist for rounds determined to be 
“primarily intended to be used for sporting purposes” or “industrial 
purposes.”193  This type of ammunition normally contains a hardened 
metal core intended to retain its shape upon impact with a target, in 
contrast to the softer lead rounds of conventional ammunition.194  
Consequently, although armor-piercing rounds have the capacity to 
penetrate deeper into the body than conventional bullets, the wounds 
they create are often narrower than wounds caused by lead-core 
ammunition.195 
It is this penetration capability, however, that presumably leads to a 
presumption of unlawfulness, although documented cases of actual 
killings with armor-piercing ammunition are rare.196  Indeed, although 
these types of ammunition are frequently referred to as “cop-killer” 
bullets, “[t]his was something of a misnomer since, at the time the law 
was voted on, there were no documented cases of a policeman being 
killed by such a bullet.”197  Additionally complicating the problem is that 
ordinary hunting ammunition for rifles has always been capable of 
penetrating most body armor, despite its legitimate uses.198  For this 
reason, it is more useful to include weapons firing high-caliber 
rounds199—though technically classified as “destructive devices”—in a 
discussion of prohibited ammunition rather than in a discussion of 
explosive devices.  Because their increased mass makes it difficult for 
the wind to impact their trajectory, high-caliber bullets are highly 
                                                                                                                       
and we’ve never had to track one.”  Id. 
 192. 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(17)(B), 922(a)(7)–(8) (defining and regulating “armor-piercing 
ammunition”). 
 193. § 921(a)(17)(C). 
 194. GARY KLECK, TARGETING GUNS: FIREARMS AND THEIR CONTROL 129 (1997). 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. (“Killings involving penetration of body armor, however, are close to nonexistent.”). 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. High-caliber rounds means ammunition larger than .50 caliber, as discussed in Part III.B.3. 
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preferred for long-range shooters.200  The concern for the long-range-
shooting capabilities and the armor-piercing character of the .50 caliber 
round led to a ban on .50 caliber rifles in California in 2004.201 
Under the Heller standards, then, are restrictions on expanding, 
armor-piercing, and high-caliber bullets permissive?  Expanding bullets, 
despite being illegal in international military use, certainly appear to 
have certain advantages in terms of “stopping power” over traditional 
ammunition and, lacking an armor-penetrating character, appear to have 
a legitimate self-defense character.  It is uncertain whether they are “in 
common use,” however, and the eighteenth-century militia certainly 
lacked ammunition designed to “mushroom” for maximum tissue 
damage.  They may be “dangerous,” but they are not significantly more 
so than traditional ammunition; indeed, as noted above, their lack of 
over-penetration suggests that they may actually be slightly less 
dangerous than standard ammunition.  Under this analysis—despite the 
international ban on their use—they seem to constitute legitimate “arms” 
under the Heller test. 
The low rate of crime associated with high-caliber and armor-
piercing bullets appears to suggest that their “typical” use is lawful in 
nature: namely, hunting and sport shooting.  Again, the eighteenth-
century militia would have lacked any analogue to these kinds of bullets, 
given the round musket balls of the day,202 and the “common use” of 
these ammunition types is questionable.  Unlike expanding bullets, 
however, these classes of ammunition do appear to share one significant 
factor: their “dangerous” character.  The long-range, armor-piercing 
capabilities of even a .50 caliber Browning Machine Gun (BMG) 
round203 and smaller “armor-piercing” ammunition both appear to 
possess significant potential—actually realized or not—to cause great 
                                                          
 200. See, e.g., Fifty Caliber Shooters Association, Inc.: Fact Sheet, 50 CALIBER SHOOTERS 
ASS’N, http://www.fcsa.org/wwwroot/visitors/about.php (last visited Nov. 12, 2011) (noting the 
“extreme long-range accuracy” of the .50 caliber rifle). 
 201. .50 Caliber BMG Regulation Act of 2004, CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 30500–30530 (West 
2012); Rebecca Leung, Big Rifle a Terrorist Tool?, CBS NEWS (Feb. 11, 2009), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/01/06/60minutes/main665257.shtml. 
 202. Although, amusingly, the bore on the “Brown Bess” was well over one-half inch in 
diameter, see Lux, supra note 11, at 85, meaning that, if it were produced today as a rifled weapon, 
the eighteenth-century musket of choice would be classified as a “destructive device” under the 
GCA.  18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(4)(B) (2006). 
 203. Leung, supra note 201 (noting the round is able to penetrate armor more than a mile away).  
It should also be noted that a .50 caliber BMG round is not a “destructive device” under federal law, 
as it is fired from rifles whose bores do not exceed “one-half inch in diameter,” although it equals 
that size.  18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(4)(B). 
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harm despite any legitimate uses they may possess.  Therefore, they 
probably do not fall within the protection of the Second Amendment 
under the Heller guidelines. 
C. An Application of the Heller Standards to New, Advanced Weaponry 
1. The Active Denial System 
Consider the military-grade Active Denial System (ADS)―which, in 
smaller form, is currently being marketed to law enforcement agencies, 
the military, and private entities as the “Silent Guardian.”204  This device, 
which has a range of up to 500 meters, causes an “intolerable heating 
sensation” to the target or targets.205  According to the U.S. military, 
targets stand a 0.1% chance of suffering actual physical injury.206  
Forgetting, for the moment, that the weapon is untested in combat—
although, again reportedly, it has been tested more than 11,000 discrete 
times on over 700 volunteers207—the initial reports indicate the weapon 
may be a promising new way to limit the deaths of protesters or other 
rioters.208 
While seemingly humanitarian on its face, the device was designed 
with one goal in mind: to cause pain without physical injury.209  It 
accomplishes this by sending penetrating rays barely one sixty-fourth of 
                                                          
 204. See Silent GuardianTM Protection System, RAYTHEON CO., http://www.raytheon.com/ 
capabilities/products/silent_guardian/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2011) (describing commercial uses for 
the “less-than-lethal” weapon alongside military ones). 
 205. Dan Cairns, US Army Heat Ray Gun in Afghanistan, BBC NEWS (July 15, 2010), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/newsbeat/10646540. 
 206. DEP’T OF DEF. JOINT NON-LETHAL WEAPONS PROGRAM, ACTIVE DENIAL TECHNOLOGY 
FACT SHEET 2 (2011), available at http://jvllwp.defense.gov/pdf/pressroom/ADT%20Fact%20 
Sheet%20Oct%202011.pdf [hereinafter ACTIVE DENIAL TECHNOLOGY FACT SHEET]. 
 207. Cairns, supra note 205. 
 208. Id.; see also Susan LeVine, JOINT NON-LETHAL WEAPONS PROGRAM, THE ACTIVE DENIAL 
SYSTEM: A REVOLUTIONARY NON-LETHAL WEAPON FOR TODAY’S BATTLEFIELD 5 (2009), 
available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ada501865.pdf&Location=U2&doc=Get 
TRDoc.pdf (“Concerns that a human target could accidentally be overexposed are mitigated by the 
fact that the beam is turned off immediately by releasing the trigger or at the expiration of a preset 
time. . . . [T]he output power level can be adjusted for different ranges to ensure safety parameters 
are not exceeded.”). 
 209. See David Hambling, US Military in Denial over ‘Pain Ray’: Concern over the Safety of a 
Crowd Control System in Tests Sparks Fears About Its Use in Operational Situations, THE 
GUARDIAN (London), Dec. 12, 2007 (“But what about a system that inflicts pain at a distance, 
without contact?  That’s the idea behind the Active Denial System now being tested by the US 
military.  It is designed to cause excruciating pain without injury by projecting a beam of energy 
about two meters across.”). 
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an inch into the skin of a target.210  The pain, however, is indeed intense.  
A reporter who volunteered to serve as a test subject for the Silent 
Guardian civilian model of the ADS recently wrote that exposure to the 
weapon—even for a fraction of a second—was “a bit like touching a red-
hot wire, but there [was] no heat, only the sensation of heat.  There [was] 
no burn mark or blister.”211 
One cannot understate the potential for abuse of such a weapon.  
Armed with a device guaranteed—intended, even—purely to cause 
physical pain, without leaving the telltale marks of physical abuse, what 
is to stop a private entity with enough money to acquire one of these 
devices from using the device for purely torture purposes?  More 
importantly for the purposes of this Comment, are these “pain rays” 
constitutionally protected “arms”? 
Applying the criteria derived from Heller, a number of contradictory 
conclusions arise.  First, the weapon is not “in common use” currently.212  
Second, the weapon is certainly “unusual” in that it is unprecedented, yet 
it is not necessarily “dangerous” in the sense that, in its current form, it 
supposedly causes no or very little physical injury.213  Third, it was 
created specifically for non-lethal crowd control.  So it is “not typically 
possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes”214 presently, 
because, as a cutting-edge development in technology, it has not yet seen 
widespread commercial use.  It is not similar to a sawed-off shotgun in 
that it is unlikely to be any more popular for committing crimes than 
other nonlethal means of self-defense.  It also lacks an analogue to any 
                                                          
 210. See ACTIVE DENIAL TECHNOLOGY FACT SHEET, supra note 206, at 1. 
 211. Michael Hanlon, ZAPPED!, DAILY MAIL (London), Sept. 19, 2007, § 1, at 15. 
 212. See supra Part III.A.1 (discussing the problems—particularly circular reasoning—of the “in 
common use” standard). 
 213. That the ADS device causes little injury is still disputed—at least one commentator has 
suggested that the weapon has the potential to cause life-threatening burns across much of the body.  
David Hambling, Army Orders Pain Ray Trucks; New Report Shows ‘Potential for Death,’ WIRED 
(Oct. 10, 2008, 9:17 AM), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2008/10/army-ordering-p/.  As 
described by Dr. Jürgen Altmann, a “less-than lethal weapons expert,” some risks exist because “the 
ADS provides the technical possibility to produce burns of second and third degree. . . . [S]uch burns 
would occur over considerable parts of the body . . . .  Without a technical device that reliably 
prevents re-triggering on the same target subject, the ADS has a potential to produce permanent 
injury or death.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 214. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 625 (2008).  Additionally, although the 
exact price of such a device is not public knowledge at present, estimates range up to the hundreds of 
thousands of dollars, making their purchase by the average citizen practically impossible.  C.J. Lin, 
Authorities at Castaic Jail Poised to Use Assault Intervention Device, DAILY NEWS (L.A.), Aug. 20, 
2010, at A1 (“A Raytheon spokeswoman declined to state the cost of the machine, but one deputy 
estimated just the hardware costs at least hundreds of thousands of dollars.”). 
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weapon owned in the eighteenth century because it represents 
revolutionary technology capable of producing pain independent of 
injury; the weapons of the Framers were, by contrast, rudimentary guns, 
blunt weapons, and bladed instruments.  Under these criteria alone, the 
Silent Guardian would almost certainly not fit the definition of “arms” 
protected by the Second Amendment. 
Yet, is this a desirable result?  Granted, the device is not without 
controversy, because of claims that one could easily disable the safety 
settings and that the weapon’s long-term effects are as-yet unknown 
despite the extensive testing performed by the military.215  Presuming, 
however, that tampering with the safety system on a Silent Guardian 
would be regulated similarly to the “making” of firearms under the 
NFA216 and that the results of the military testing performed on the 
weapon’s effects are accurate, the nonlethal, pain-inducing weapon 
appears perfect for self-defense, as opposed to criminal activities.217  
Self-defense being one of the “lawful purposes” suggested by Heller,218 
there appears to be no valid reason, pragmatically speaking, for 
excluding this weapon from the protected class of “arms” under the 
Second Amendment, aside from pure technophobia.  Perhaps 
unfortunately, however, a strict application of the Heller criteria forces 
the conclusion that these weapons are not protected arms, regardless of 
their benefits. 
2. Hand-Held Class IV Lasers 
The Code of Federal Regulations defines a Class IV laser as “any 
laser that permits human access during operation to levels of laser 
radiation in excess of the accessible emission limits”219 and is even more 
                                                          
 215. See Hanlon, supra note 211 (speculating that one could, presumably, disable the safety 
features); Noah Shachtman, Pain Ray Injures Airman, WIRED (Apr. 6, 2007, 10:54 AM), 
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2007/04/pain_ray_injure/ (reporting that a U.S. airman received 
second-degree burns from exposure to the device). 
 216. 26 U.S.C. § 5845(i) (2006) (defining “mak[ing]” to mean “manufacturing . . . , putting 
together, altering, . . . or otherwise producing a firearm”). 
 217. It is perfect for self-defense, not criminal activities, in that a criminal wielding a 
hypothetical handheld version of the Silent Guardian or the ADS could cause only a single person at 
a time to feel pain, while failing to intimidate anyone else from approaching him.  Logically 
speaking, people do not “rush” gunmen for fear of being shot—but if the weapon lacks the capability 
of killing them, that fear is lost.  If a cashier has no reason to fear a would-be robber’s weapon, then 
he has no incentive to cooperate with the robber. 
 218. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628. 
 219. Performance Standards for Light-Emitting Products, 21 C.F.R. § 1040.10(b)(11) (2011). 
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powerful than a Class IIIb laser, which is considered an “acute hazard to 
the skin and eyes from direct and scattered radiation.”220  Under these 
regulations, a Class IV laser is any laser that produces a beam with a 
minimum of .5 watts of power.221  For reference, the next most powerful 
laser classification, the Class IIIb, ranges between .005 and .5 watts,222 
and it can still be hazardous to the eye upon direct eye exposure.223 
The Code of Federal Regulations mandates that manufacturers equip 
a Class IV or Class IIIb laser with a “remote interlock connector,”224 a 
“key-actuated master control,”225 and an “emission indicator” that signals 
when the beam is active,226 along with other safety features required of 
lower powered lasers.227  If Class IV lasers are considered “arms” 
alongside a handgun, however, then the requirements imposed by these 
safety provisions begin to look disturbingly similar to the requirement of 
a trigger lock in Heller—which, in the words of the Court, “makes it 
impossible for citizens to use them for the core lawful purpose of self-
defense and is hence unconstitutional.”228 
But are hand-held Class IV lasers “arms”?  If implemented as 
weapons, their usefulness would be their capacity to permanently blind a 
target struck by even reflected rays; they lack the sophistication, at the 
moment, to match the stopping power of conventional firearms.  One 
should note that the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 
Protocol IV, expressly prohibits the use of “laser weapons specifically 
designed, as their sole combat function or as one of their combat 
functions, to cause permanent blindness to unenhanced vision.”229  The 
United States is a party to this treaty and is thus bound by international 
                                                          
 220. § 1040.10(b)(11) n.5. 
 221. § 1040.10(d) tbl.III-B. 
 222. § 1040.10(d) tbls.III-A, III-B. 
 223. Fact Sheet: Laser Safety, U. KY. ENVTL. HEALTH & SAFETY, http://ehs.uky.edu/ehs/ 
radiation/laser_fs.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2011). 
 224. § 1040.10(f)(3) (requiring that the remote interlock connector bar “human access to all laser 
and collateral radiation from the laser product in excess of the accessible emission limits”). 
 225. § 1040.10(f)(4) (“[T]he laser shall not be operable when the key is removed.”). 
 226. § 1040.10(f)(5)(ii).  The emission indicator “provides a visible or audible signal” during and 
sufficiently prior to emission of accessible laser radiation in excess of the accessible emission limits 
of the regulation.  Id. 
 227. § 1040.10(f)(1)–(2). 
 228. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 630 (2008). 
 229. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons 
Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Protocol IV, 
art. 1, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 7. 
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law to refrain from employing blinding lasers in battle.230  The 
convention is inapplicable to the civilians of the signatory states, 
however, and so a hand-held “combat” Class IV laser would, 
theoretically, be available to civilians. 
Again, to answer the question of the “arms” status of Class IV lasers, 
one must consult the criteria derived from Heller.  First, these lasers are 
not “in common use” currently.231  Second, they are certainly “unusual” 
because they are unprecedented in civilian markets, and they are 
“dangerous” in the sense that permanent blindness is a highly probable 
result of employing such a tool.  Finally, they were not created 
specifically for a military purpose.232  Given the Court’s statement that 
“arms” need not refer purely to weapons with a military purpose,233 
however, this is not fatal to the weapon’s classification.  They are not 
“typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes”234 
presently because, again, they represent revolutionary developments in 
technology and have only recently become commercially available.235  
Again, however, these tools are not analogous to a sawed-off shotgun 
because they are unlikely to be any more popular for committing crimes 
than other nonlethal means of self-defense.  Finally, unless history is 
very much mistaken, the Founding Fathers did not possess lasers of any 
sort.  It should come as no great shock, then, to suggest that these items 
are not analogous to any weapon owned in the eighteenth century.  Thus, 
the Class IV lasers are almost certainly not “arms” under Heller, despite 
being less “dangerous” than modern firearms. 
                                                          
 230. See Disarmament: State Parties and Signatories, U.N. OFFICE AT GENEVA, 
http://www.unog.ch/__80256ee600585943.nsf/%28httpPages%29/3ce7cfc0aa4a7548c12571c00039
cb0c?OpenDocument&ExpandSection=1#_Section1 (last visited Nov. 12, 2011). 
 231. See supra Part III.A.1 (discussing the problems—particularly circular reasoning—of the “in 
common use” standard). 
 232. See S3 Arctic Series, supra note 64 (offering the lasers for sale to the public). 
 233. Heller, 554 U.S. at 581 (“The term was applied, then as now, to weapons that were not 
specifically designed for military use and were not employed in a military capacity.”). 
 234. Heller, 554 U.S. at 625. 
 235. Jason Jacobs, Wicked Lasers Spyder III Artic Blue Laser, TECHWARELABS (Aug. 29, 2010) 
(“However, blue direct blue laser diodes have just now become available in the consumer market.  
Wicked Lasers has created partnerships with the world’s leading blue diode manufacturers to create 
the world’s first 445nm direct blue diode portable laser, the Arctic.” (quoting the Wicked Lasers 
website) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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D. A Possible Interpretive Framework for the Heller Standards 
The Heller Court was decidedly unconcerned with vagueness in the 
“standards” it suggested as proper.236  As seen in the preceding analysis, 
there is very little definite meaning in the majority of these criteria.237  
One finds little consistency in applying them to both conventional and 
advanced weaponry, even as part of a factors test—which the Court 
never stated them to be.238  Nevertheless, this Comment contends that the 
only way to craft a comprehensive analytical framework from the four 
standards derived from Heller is to apply them as part of a factors test, 
each independent of the other. 
1. A Proposed Framework 
Although the Court seemed to imply that “in common use” was the 
sole bright-line test to be applied in a consideration of a weapon’s 
protected status,239 the preceding discussion shows that “in common use” 
holds very little value as an objective standard.240  This Comment 
                                                          
 236. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 635. 
Justice Breyer chides us for leaving so many applications of the right to keep and bear 
arms in doubt, and for not providing extensive historical justification for those 
regulations of the right that we describe as permissible.  But since this case represents this 
Court’s first in-depth examination of the Second Amendment, one should not expect it to 
clarify the entire field . . . .  And there will be time enough to expound upon the historical 
justifications for the exceptions we have mentioned if and when those exceptions come 
before us. 
Id. (citations omitted) (citing id. at 720–21 (Breyer, J., dissenting)). 
 237. It is possible that, given the relatively small amount of Second Amendment jurisprudence 
on the matter, the Court left the matter intentionally vague.  Even if this is the case, however, the 
Heller standards serve little use to guide any inquiry into the matter. 
 238. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 627.  Not once did the Court refer to the analysis it uses as anything 
but a singular test: “Miller said, as we have explained, that the sorts of weapons protected were those 
‘in common use at the time.’  We think that limitation is fairly supported by the historical tradition 
of prohibiting the carrying of ‘dangerous and unusual weapons.’”  Id. (citations omitted) (citing 
United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939)). 
 239. See id. (citing Miller, 307 U.S. at 179). 
 240. This Comment is certainly not the first to note the problems with “in common use” as a 
standard.  See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-
Defense: An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 1478–81 
(2009) (discussing six reasons why it is not clear how courts should apply the Heller standard); 
Adam Winkler, Heller’s Catch-22, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1551, 1560–61 (2009) (“In contrast to 
handguns, the Court suggests that machine guns might be banned because they are ‘dangerous and 
unusual weapons’ that are not in ‘common use.’  But why are machine guns so rare?  Because 
federal law has effectively prevented civilians from purchasing them for the past seventy-five years.” 
(citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 624–25)). 
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contends, as well, that Heller both misquotes and, consequently, derives 
an incorrect holding from Miller.  The phrase “common use” appears 
only once in Miller.241  It does not announce a standard, but, rather, refers 
to history: 
The signification attributed to the term Militia appears from the 
debates in the Convention, the history and legislation of Colonies 
and States, and the writings of approved commentators.  These 
show plainly enough that the Militia comprised all males physically 
capable of acting in concert for the common defense.  ‘A body of 
citizens enrolled for military discipline.’  And further, that 
ordinarily when called for service these men were expected to 
appear bearing arms supplied by themselves and of the kind in 
common use at the time.242 
Had the Heller Court actually implemented the standard used to 
uphold a ban on sawed-off shotguns in Miller, however, this Comment 
would instead discuss what weapons have “some reasonable relationship 
to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia”243 instead of 
a “common use” critique.  As the Heller Court noted, an application of 
the militia-utility standard might very well mandate a finding that the 
long-standing federal restrictions on machine guns or other weapons of 
potential use to a militia are unconstitutional—a result that the Court 
appeared unwilling to accept.244  Nevertheless, the fact remains that the 
importance the Heller Court placed on “in common use” is nothing like 
that found in Miller, from which such precedent was supposedly derived 
in the first place. 
Instead of simple reliance on the “common use” test, this Comment 
proposes—based on the criteria suggested in Heller—a two-part inquiry.  
In order to qualify as protected arms under the Second Amendment, this 
test would require (1) that the weapon pose no significantly greater threat 
to human life than a handgun and (2) that the innate characteristics of the 
weapon generally favor legitimate purposes over criminal ones.  The 
“common use,” “typically possessed,” and “unusual” portions of the 
Heller test would all serve as useful factors in applying the second part 
of this new test.  The “dangerous” and “lawful purposes” elements are 
                                                          
 241. Miller, 307 U.S. at 179. 
 242. Id. at 179 (emphasis added). 
 243. Id. at 178. 
 244. Heller, 554 U.S. at 624 (“That would be a startling reading of the opinion, since it would 
mean that the National Firearms Act’s restrictions on machine[]guns (not challenged in Miller) 
might be unconstitutional, machine[]guns being useful in warfare in 1939.”). 
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more precisely defined under this inquiry than under the Heller criteria, 
yet they remain true to the opinion’s spirit.245 
Even under this streamlined test, however, the required analysis is 
neither easy nor remotely close to perfect.  The emphasis that the new 
test would place on evaluating the relative “danger” a weapon poses is a 
particularly odious—but necessary—consideration, for it necessitates a 
crude weighing of raw human lives against the utility that a particular 
weapon bears for lawful purposes.  Yet, however unpleasant this 
requirement may appear, it is absolutely essential to the creation of a 
sensible and comprehensive framework for Second Amendment analysis.  
Without a frank, clinical appraisal of a weapon’s destructive capacity, 
courts are left merely with its simple popularity and the historical 
blessing or stigma attached to it.246 
Note that this test bases the consideration of danger upon the 
handgun rather than on the rifle or other hunting weapon.  The reason for 
this is twofold.  First, although handguns are often both highly lethal and 
easy to conceal, they nevertheless provide no significantly greater utility 
to a criminal than they would to an individual merely trying to defend 
himself.247  Second, the Supreme Court has already blessed the use of the 
handgun as a baseline weapon for self-defense purposes;248 it is beyond 
both the scope and the intent of this Comment to argue with the Court. 
                                                          
 245. Although similarity to eighteenth-century weapons is, as this Comment hopefully showed, 
perhaps the least useful of the Heller standards in determining the value of a weapon, the nature of 
the first part of the proposed test incorporates, perhaps, a more intuitive evaluation of these criteria.  
That is, a court ought to asses “dangerousness” in relation to eighteenth-century firearms rather than 
in a void.  The handgun replaces the musket in the proposed test—the handgun being the spiritual 
descendant of the musket in terms of its “common use”—only because the Supreme Court has 
effectively blessed the use of the handgun as a baseline weapon.  See id. at 627–29. 
 246. For example, the “blackjack”—a kind of small, easy-to-conceal truncheon—was reviled by 
the Michigan Supreme Court as having “the reputation of being a characteristic weapon of urban 
gangsters and rowdies.”  See People v. Brown, 235 N.W. 245, 247 (Mich. 1931) (en banc) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Despite the fact that such a weapon is far less lethal than a handgun, the 
Brown court nevertheless ruled that, due to its reputation as a weapon of criminals, it was not 
protected under the state constitutional right to bear arms.  Id.  Such a stigma may prove illustrative 
if it manages to highlight the characteristics of a weapon that make it desirable to criminals, 
however, and for this reason it is useful to at least be mindful of the popularity a weapon holds with 
criminals in considering whether that weapon should fall within the protection of the Second 
Amendment. 
 247. Handguns provide no greater utility to a criminal than to an individual defending himself in 
the sense that a homeowner seeking to defend himself from a robber would have every bit as much 
use for such a weapon as would the robber seeking to harm him.  It is an uneasy equilibrium, to be 
sure, but given the enshrined status of the right to bear arms in this nation’s history and Constitution, 
it is an equilibrium that the law must accept. 
 248. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010); Heller, 554 U.S. at 628–
29. 
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This test is in no way contradictory to the considerations the Court 
has already articulated.  It merely consolidates and prioritizes those 
criteria based on the preceding analysis.  By emphasizing the inherent 
characteristics of a weapon over its mere popularity, this new test 
hopefully accomplishes a comprehensive, sensible framework for both 
limiting the extent of arms protected by the Second Amendment and 
simultaneously extending that protection to advanced, previously 
inconceivable nonlethal weapons. 
2. Application of the Proposed Framework 
a. Short-Barreled Shotguns and Rifles 
As has already been discussed, the chief advantages gained from 
shortening the barrel of either a shotgun or a rifle lie in the greater ease 
of concealment of such weapons after modification, as these weapons are 
not markedly more “dangerous” after barrel shortening.249  Both are more 
powerful than most handguns, but no more so than a standard, 
unmodified rifle or shotgun;250 thus, one may conclude that these 
weapons do not pose a significantly greater danger to human life than a 
handgun would.  For this reason, short-barrel shotguns and rifles would 
pass the first part of this proposed two-part test. 
Yet under the second criterion—that the weapon’s innate 
characteristics must generally favor legitimate purposes over criminal 
ones—these weapons both fail to find protected status as “arms.”  As 
discussed, the prospect of an easy-to-conceal, high-powered weapon is 
extremely attractive for criminal purposes,251 while a person seeking only 
self-defense would find it no more advantageous to use such a weapon 
than he would a handgun.  Thus, Second Amendment protection does 
not, and should not, extend to short-barreled rifles and shotguns. 
b. Machine Guns 
As noted earlier, machine guns, in general, are markedly more lethal 
than most handguns.252  This lends itself to the conclusion that the 
                                                          
 249. See supra notes 169–73 and accompanying text. 
 250. See supra note 169 and accompanying text. 
 251. See ZAWITZ, supra note 173, at 2. 
 252. Machine guns are more lethal than handguns in terms of potentially lethal shots each is 
generally capable of firing within the same time period.  See supra notes 183–86. 
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hypothetical legitimate self-defender likely would not simply “spray and 
pray” if he actually sought to defend himself from an assault, for fear of 
hitting a family member or innocent bystander.  A criminal on a killing 
spree, on the other hand, probably would have no compunction about 
such an act.  Because they thus fail both parts of the proposed test, 
machine guns are not protected by the Second Amendment. 
c. Class IV Lasers 
Blinding lasers do not constitute a greater risk to human life than a 
handgun does, despite their ability to blind.253  They have little use for a 
criminal, save perhaps blinding a witness to prevent him from identifying 
the criminal.  But there are already plenty of other ways in which to 
accomplish such a purpose,254 and a victim need only shield his eyes to 
prevent being harmed by a laser.  For this reason, although they were not 
necessarily designed as weapons, this Comment’s proposed test indicates 
that Class IV lasers should be protected under the Second Amendment. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Although the Supreme Court spent more than two centuries in near 
total silence on the issue of what “arms” are protected by the Second 
Amendment, the recent application of the right to bear arms against the 
states necessitates the creation and articulation of a coherent, precise 
standard to evaluate the lawfulness of any regulation of both current and 
future weapons.  Without such a standard to guide future lawmaking—
that is, relying on the current, underdeveloped standard—the level of 
uncertainty regarding the kinds of “arms” that can be lawfully banned 
will only increase as weapons technology continues to evolve and 
develop.  Already modern weapons are totally alien in comparison with 
the muskets of the eighteenth-century militiamen; the arms they wielded 
bear little resemblance to those of the modern day.  Yet, perhaps, by 
applying considerations such as those advanced in Heller under a more 
definite, concrete framework—such as that proposed in this Comment—
the Court can articulate a comprehensible and comprehensive standard to 
settle, once and for all, the true scope of Second Amendment “arms.” 
                                                          
 253. A gun may also blind, but any wound caused by a bullet to the eyes would likely cause far 
greater harm than blindness alone. 
 254. The most obvious method is simply gouging out the victim’s eyes, though this is certainly 
more difficult than casually blinding a victim with a laser. 
